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Nursing knowledge: Its nature and generation. 
Key points 
1. Nurses need knowledge because nursing is a practical discipline. 
2. Explaining events by deriving them from laws of nature and understanding them rationally 
are distinct. Nurses need to know both. 
3. Knowledge of facts and of values depends on distinct approaches and forms of justification. 
On some views, value judgements are merely subjective on other views uncodifiable. 
4. There is reason to think that explicit knowledge depends on a bedrock of tacit knowledge. 
5. Nursing practice draws on a potentially unlimited set of other disciplines to inform patient 
care. This places a heavy burden on knowledge-based practice. 
6. The co-production of knowledge suggests a more equal role for patients and service users, a 
richer source of knowledge but also some challenges. 
7. Because clinical judgement has to select from a body of knowledge to match a particular 
patient’s needs, nursing is an art as well as a science. 
Introduction 
What kind of knowledge underpins good nursing practice? Is it a unified field? And if not, what are 
the appropriate methods for arriving at new knowledge? In this chapter, we will consider three 
important distinctions which divide up forms of knowledge and argue that, in each case, nursing 
knowledge is found on both sides. Nurses must be able to understand their patients / service users 
as well as explain the course of their illnesses. They must know about facts and about values. And 
they must have tacit knowledge as well as explicit knowledge of their profession. 
This suggests that nursing knowledge is not a single unified field but rather draws on a range of 
different disciplines. Given the requirements on the nature of knowledge itself, this suggests that a 
range of quite different approaches are necessary to generate new knowledge. The challenges are 
increased especially in mental healthcare by the aim of co-producing knowledge with patients or 
service users. Finally, we will suggest that that this places the skill of identifying the right pieces of 
knowledge appropriate for each particular patient or service user at the heart of nursing. Although 
underpinned by scientific knowledge, this ability to judge what is relevant can helpfully be 
interpreted as an art. 
This chapter concerns some deep philosophical questions about the kind of knowledge nurses need 
to have. Our contention is that knowledge of a variety of different kinds lies at the heart of good 
nursing care. Dealing with this is the key – practical and philosophical – challenge of modern nursing. 
The value of knowledge 
Reflection point: Why should nurses aim to have knowledge of their subject? What is the value of 
knowledge? Think about this question before reading on. One clue might be to think about possible 
opposites to knowledge. If nursing practices were not based on knowledge, on what might they be 
based? Write down some ideas. 
Answering the question of the value of knowledge is difficult. We will approach it via a preliminary 
question: what is knowledge or what does ‘knowledge’ mean? Now there might not be a very 
helpful or informative answer to this question. There may not be a very helpful definition available. 
But some general features of knowledge can, however, be learnt from particular examples. Suppose 
that Staff Nurse Robin knows that, because it is 5pm, Service User/Patient Terry is due for 
medication. If so, Robin must hold, or take it to be, true that it is time for his medication. That is, she 
must at least believe it. (‘At least’ because we often use the word ‘believe’ when we are not sure we 
do know something. “Do you know that?” “Well I believe it.”) Second, if Robin does know that Terry 
is due for medication, then Terry must really be due for medication. If Robin has knowledge, what 
she believes must be true.  
Third, Robin’s belief cannot merely be accidentally true. Neither a reckless guess nor an ungrounded 
hunch can support knowledge even if they turn out to be true. They might, too easily, not have been 
true. But knowledge can be undermined even when one does one’s best. Suppose Robin believes 
that it is time for Terry’s medication because she knows that he takes medication every day at 5pm 
and she believes, by looking at the ward clock, that it is now 5pm. But suppose that the normally 
reliable ward clock which has, in fact, stopped the day before. By lucky chance, however, it is now 
nearly 5pm. If so, although Robin has a true belief that it is time for Terry’s medication she does not 
know it. If she had looked at the clock an hour earlier she would have formed the false belief that it 
was 5pm and so time for his medication.  
These constraints on knowledge have motivated a definition which dates back 2,000 years to the 
Greek philosopher Plato: knowledge is justified, true belief.  
The idea is that needing a justification for a belief (for it to count as knowledge) should rule out 
merely lucky true beliefs. But this prompts a question: in the example of Robin and the stopped 
ward clock, does that work?  
Reflection point: Think about this question for a moment. Does the traditional analysis give the 
correct account of Robin? Here is a clue: ask whether Robin has a justification for thinking the time is 
5pm and also ask whether her true belief is lucky. If the answer to both is ‘yes’ then the traditional 
account does not address the problem of luck. If it does not, could some modification could be made 
to the definition? 
We will return to this question shortly.  
As well as trying to rule out merely lucky true beliefs, justification also plays a second role which is 
helpful for thinking about the challenge of generating nursing knowledge. It provides a way, or a 
method, or a route, to aim at true beliefs. It is one thing to worry that one’s beliefs about the latest 
medication for mental illness may not be right, but quite another to work out how to avoid being 
wrong.  
Suppose a hospital authority issued an instruction that all nursing staff should replace any false 
beliefs they hold with true beliefs. On the face of it, this seems a good aim. But would the instruction 
help? The problem is that ‘from the inside’ true beliefs and false beliefs seem the same. To hold a 
belief is to hold it to be true. To believe that something is not true is precisely not to believe it. Thus 
beliefs which are, in fact, false are not transparently so to someone who holds them. So the 
instruction is not helpful.  
By contrast, the following instruction would help: replace any beliefs that one holds without 
justification with beliefs that do have justifications or grounds. One can tell whether one believes 
something for a reason, or with a justification. And further, by aiming at having only justified beliefs, 
one should in general succeed in reaching true beliefs since justification is, in general, conducive to 
truth. Any ‘justification’ which did not increase the chances of a belief being true would not be a 
justification for it after all. This approach lies at the heart of Evidence Based Medicine but applies 
more broadly. 
Although justification can play this second, helpful role of providing a concrete way of aiming at true 
beliefs it is not so successful in the first role mentioned above: ruling out being merely true by luck. 
As the example of Robin and the stopped clock illustrates, Robin does have a justification for 
believing that it is 5pm: she can point to the clock. Nevertheless, her belief is only true by luck 
because, as the narrator of the film Withnail and I says: even a stopped clock gives the right time 
twice a day. So she has a justification for a belief and the belief is true but no one would say that she 
knows the time. 
Although the definition that knowledge is justified true belief dominated philosophy for 2,000 years 
since Plato, the problem that one might have a justified, true belief but still not have knowledge was 
first pointed out in the 1960s by the philosopher Edmund Gettier using an example like this one 
[Gettier 1963]. What follows?  
It may seem that, as a definition of knowledge, ‘justified, true belief’ must fail (because Robin has 
justified, true belief but she does not have knowledge, she is merely lucky). But a better response is 
to argue that what the example really shows is that Robin does not really have a proper justification, 
a good enough justification for knowledge. Knowledge can still be correctly understood as justified, 
true belief but not everything that one might think of as a justification (in the example, looking at 
the ward clock) really is a justification (because the clock has stopped). Knowledge and justification 
are a pair of concepts that one learns at the same time. The definition highlights the essential 
connection between them. The route to knowledge to underpin nursing practice will be, as 
suggested above, through suitable justification. 
We will end this section by returning to the question we first raised. Why should nurses aim to have 
knowledge of their subject? What is the value of knowledge? Part of the answer is this. Because 
knowledge, unlike say mere rumour or public opinion on which nursing might otherwise be based, is 
by definition true, aiming at knowledge is aiming at truth.  
Now it may seem obvious that in a purely theoretical or contemplative discipline one should aim at 
truth for its own sake. Cosmologists, for example, want to understand how the universe works just 
for the sake of understanding it. But there is a further reason for nurses to aim at truth. This is 
because nursing is a practical discipline. It aims not just to understand health and illness but to make 
a difference, to change people’s states of illness to health. And in general, actions – eg. medical 
interventions – based on true beliefs are more likely to succeed than those based on false ones. So 
nurses should aim at having true beliefs in order that their practical interventions in the lives of their 
patients are more likely to be successful. But because there are no intrinsic signs or symptoms of 
true beliefs that mark them out from false beliefs, the route to this is via a suitable justification 
which forms part of the conceptually rich idea of knowledge. 
In this section, we have raised a fundamental question: why should nurses aim at knowledge. By 
‘unpacking’ the concept of knowledge we have suggested answers which connect to the value of 
truth, the role of justification as a way of aiming at truth and the practical ambitions of nursing to 
intervene in patients’ lives.  
But although we have talked about nursing knowledge, there are reasons to think that the diversity 
of forms of knowledge that nurses need to know makes the phrase ‘nursing knowledge’ misleading. 
Towards the end of the chapter we will provocatively suggest that there is no such thing as ‘nursing 
knowledge’ and also that nursing is as much an art as a science. But in the next three sections, we 
will discuss some broad divisions of kinds of knowledge and suggest that nursing straddles each 
divide. Hence in each case, the generation of new knowledge to underpin practice has to draw on 
distinct methods and approaches which adds to the challenge of being a modern nurse. 
Explanation and understanding 
In the first section we asked what knowledge was and considered the definition: ‘justified, true 
belief’. The question, and the discussion which followed, may suggest that knowledge is a single 
unified sort of state. In fact, however, what is called ‘knowledge’ can be subdivided. Now one way to 
divide up knowledge would be to divide it very finely by subject matter. 
For example, knowledge of human physiology subdivides into knowledge of the skeletal system, the 
muscular system, the immune system, the renal system etc. And knowledge of the skeletal system 
divides between itself subdivides into the ribs, vertebrae, cranium etc. But whilst the facts 
concerning the skeletal system differ from those of muscular system, there is no reason to think that 
the form of knowledge differs in these cases. What one knows differs but the nature of knowledge 
itself does not. 
Some divisions, however, do seem to concern not just what is known – the facts – but the way it is 
known. Consider these two examples of patient history. 
Mr Smith is a 65 year old man who visits his GP because recently he needs to pass urine more 
frequently but is having difficulty. His GP gains permission to perform a digital rectal examination of 
Mr Smith’s prostate. He also requests an oncology appointment for a prostate-specific antigen test 
whose levels are raised if there are cancerous cells in the prostate, as well as to run an ultrasound in 
order to determine its size. From these diagnostic tests, the stage and grade of any cancer in Mr 
Smith’s prostate can be determined, and the progress of the disease monitored and treatment 
adjusted accordingly. 
Miss Singh is a 23 year old who has been referred to a community mental health team by her GP 
because she has recently had very strong feelings and ideas to end her life. A nurse gains permission 
to ask Miss Singh some questions and hears that Miss Singh has been finding it hard to fall asleep, 
that she struggles to get out of bed and her appetite has dropped considerably in the past few 
months. She cannot plan for or see any happiness in her future. The nurse thinks that these could be 
some symptoms of depression and asks about Miss Singh’s past. Miss Singh tell the nurse that her 
mother passed away a few years and this event left her depressed. After some further questions the 
nurse discovers that it is approaching the date of Miss Singh’s mother’s death. 
Reflection point: what are the typical indicators that one is on the right track top have grasped the 
biological course of a disease? And what for the development of a patient or service user’s attitude to 
their diagnosis? Are they the same?  
In both cases, GPs and nurses aim at knowledge: a truthful account backed up by reasons. In one 
case, the justification flows from a process of looking at medical records and diagnostic tests and in 
the other of asking questions and having a conversation. Despite sharing the aim of knowledge, 
these two accounts appear to have different structures. One accords with a structure of biological 
processes described by physiological laws of nature. The other has a psychological structure of 
thinking, feeling and acting for reasons. 
The idea that there is a difference of kind between these forms of knowledge dates back to debates 
about psychology in the late nineteenth century called, in German, the Methodenstreit. The 
philosopher and psychiatrist Karl Jaspers is of particular relevance to mental health nursing. Like 
now, psychiatry at the start of the twentieth century was dominated by neuroscience and the 
assumption that mental illnesses were really brain illnesses. Jaspers thought that biological 
psychiatry had been taken too far and stressed the need for understanding in addition to 
explanation. Whilst explanation tracked objective measurable symptoms, understanding was 
necessary to grasp subjective symptoms. Taking empathy to be a key aspect of understanding he 
said: 
Objective symptoms can all be directly and convincingly demonstrated to anyone capable of 
sense-perception and logical thought; but subjective symptoms, if they are to be 
understood, must be referred to some process which, in contrast to sense perception and 
logical thought, is usually described by the same term ‘subjective’. Subjective symptoms 
cannot be perceived by the sense-organs, but have to be grasped by transferring oneself, so 
to say, into the other individual’s psyche; that is, by empathy. They can only become an 
inner reality for the observer by his participating in the other person’s experiences, not by 
any intellectual effort. [Jaspers 1968: 1313] 
The distinction between explanation and understanding can be thought of as the difference 
between deriving events from general scientific natural laws concerning what typically happens 
versus fitting them into normative patterns of good reasons, what should happen, what makes 
shared sense. 
The distinction has an echo in the balance in contemporary mental healthcare between Evidence 
Based Medicine (EBM), on the one hand, and person centred care, on the other. Whilst EBM 
emphasises the importance of generalities by privileging evidence derived from large scale 
randomised control trials (RCTs), person centred care stresses the importance of a focus on 
individual patients.  
In order to care for patients and service users nurses need knowledge that spans both sides of this 
distinction. They need to grasp the laws that govern the workings of human physiology and which 
describe the course of illnesses including mental illnesses. But they also need to be able to 
understand mental health service users or patients: their hopes, fears, beliefs, desires and 
experiences. This is knowledge of central importance for healthcare. 
How then is it possible to generate new nursing knowledge on both sides of this conceptual divide? 
New explanatory knowledge – that is knowledge based on natural scientific laws – is the focus of 
Evidence Based Medicine hose main approach is the randomised control trial (RCT) or, even better, 
the meta-analysis of randomised control trials. Such knowledge is underpinned by research that 
seeks out larger and larger study groups in order to avoid the potential errors and biases introduced 
by small populations and particular researchers.  
New knowledge from the other side, the understanding rather than explanation side, of the 
distinction calls for a different approach: to continue to listen to the changing beliefs, wishes and 
feelings of patients recognising that listening is a skill that can be practiced and developed. By 
contrast with the ever more general perspective of explanation, looking away from the individual to 
the general population-based research of EBM, the key focus for understanding is away from the 
general and towards the individual patient. 
Knowledge of facts and values 
In the previous section, we outlined the importance of a distinction between explanation based on 
general laws and understanding individuals in a distinctive way by trying to fit their utterances, 
experiences and actions in ways that make shared sense. In their influential book, Evidence-based 
Medicine: How to practice and teach EBM, David Sackett and colleagues define EBM as follows. 
‘Evidence based medicine is the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and 
patient values.’ [Sackett et al 2000]. This is a surprising definition. Normally the focus of EBM is on 
the first element of that tripartite division: research evidence. But Sackett et al widen their definition 
to include two further aspects: expertise and values. They give a further brief preliminary sketch of 
each as follows. 
By best research evidence we mean clinically relevant research… 
By clinical expertise we mean the ability to use our clinical skills and past experience to 
rapidly identify each patient’s unique health state and diagnosis, their individual risks and 
benefits of potential interventions, and their personal values and expectations 
By patient values we mean the unique preferences, concerns and expectations each patient 
brings to a clinical encounter and which must be integrated into clinical decisions if they are 
to serve the patient. [ibid: 3] 
This broad definition suggests a further important distinction for nursing knowledge: that between 
facts and values.  
Nurses need to know about research evidence concerning the workings of the brain and mind – the 
biomedical facts – but also about values: those of their patients and service users but also their own 
and those of broader society. They need to know not just about evidence based- but also about 
values based-practice. This prompts the following question: is knowledge of values a distinct kind of 
knowledge from knowledge of facts? 
Let us take an example. Mrs Jones is a 29 year old mother of one. She has a diagnosis of bi-polar 
affective disorder, which is successfully managed by Sodium Valproate. She and her partner are 
planning to try for another child. This poses two risks, firstly that of neural tube damage in the 
potential child, birth defects and developmental delay. A second factor is the risk of Mrs Jones 
developing post-partum psychosis. She has some choices. She may well wish to continue taking 
Sodium Valproate, with a full understanding of the risks to her child. Perhaps she has been on other 
mood stabilising medication in the past and has found the side effects unbearable. A further issue 
could be that Mr and Mrs Jones express a desire that, if Mrs Jones were to become psychotic after 
childbirth, she be treated at home rather than a mother and child unit. This again contravenes best 
practice. But there could be reasons why Mr and Mrs Jones would wish for treatment at home.  
As we stressed at the start, nursing is a practical discipline. It aims to change the world as well as 
understand it. So a case like this prompts the question: what is the right course of action? An 
informed answer will include the best medical evidence for the likely prognoses of interventions. But 
knowledge of the bio-medical facts is only part of the story. Another part might concern relevant 
economic facts concerning treatments permitted by NICE. But another will concern the values 
relevant to a decision. These will include those values encapsulated in mental health law concerning 
capacity. They will include a range of ethical factors some of which will command wide agreement 
whilst others will be contentious. Yet others concern the wishes, hopes, fears of, primarily, the 
patient or service user. 
Outlining the nature of values based practice is beyond the scope of this chapter. But it is obvious 
that knowledge of facts and values can be very different. There is no equivalent of RCTs to decide 
how we ought to act. The closest equivalent, in the case of medical ethical values, might be 
knowledge of ethical principles such as the Four Principles approach of respect for beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy and justice [Beauchamp and Childress 2001]. But whereas natural forces, for 
example, can be added together using vector addition, there is no general calculus for saying when, 
for example, the principle of autonomy should trump beneficence and when the other way round. 
Further, ethical values are merely one subset of the values, preferences, traditions that need to be 
taken into consideration in vales based practice and thus the prospect for codifying all the value 
judgements relevant for clinical decisions are dim. 
Some proponents of values based practice argue for an even more dramatic difference in the nature 
of knowledge of facts and values. Bill Fulford, for example, thinks that values are subjective. They lie 
merely in the eyes of the beholder. Fulford thus argues that successful values based practice in 
mental healthcare does not aim at a correct judgement but to follow a good process [Fulford 2005]. 
It is a matter of following the appropriate deliberative process, exercising good communication skills, 
and seeing what view emerges rather than aiming to get the values in a particular situation 
objectively right.  
Others argue that even though there is no algorithm for forming a view of what to do in a particular 
situation, that does not rule out the idea that value judgements aim at truth, that value judgements 
are objective [Thornton 2011]. On this latter view, whilst knowledge of values is not reducible to, or 
codified in, general principles it is still a form of knowledge of the values inherent in the clinical 
situation. 
But whatever the best view of values based practice there is no doubt that values based practice and 
evidence based practice call on different kinds of expertise based on a sensitivity to different 
features of the world: the bio-medical facts and patients’ and others’ values. Nurses need both, 
however. 
Is it possible to generate new knowledge of values relevant for nursing practice? (We considered 
new knowledge of explanatory facts relevant for nursing practice in the previous section.)  
Reflection point: think for a moment about the kind of skills that might be involved in values based 
practice. Do they depend on knowledge of values? If so, how does one acquire such knowledge? 
This is a difficult question for which there is no clear cut answer. To begin, it depends on the view of 
values one takes. If one thinks that value judgements are subjective then there are no new truths 
about values to be discovered, because there are no truths about values, merely new truths about 
what people, as a matter of fact, like or dislike. But, even so, there may be new approaches to values 
based practice in the way that Fulford’s or the ‘Four Principles’ approaches were both new 
developments in their day. 
If on the other hand, one thinks that values are real or objective features of the world, then the 
possibility of new general knowledge of values will hang on the possibility of a kind of moral – and 
other value – progress. On this view, the present day rejection of the historical claim that plantation 
slaves who had a compulsion to run away suffered a form of mental illness, ‘drapetomania’, is a 
piece of moral progress and hence new knowledge of the values that underpin mental health and 
illness. It is a piece of knowledge, on this view, because reasons can be given to justify the claim that 
there was something wrong with thinking of such behaviour as pathological. Exploring such reasons 
is as much developing a kind of sensitivity to other people as it is learning general rules. 
Tacit and explicit knowledge 
The characterisation of evidence based medicine from Sackett and colleagues above also highlights a 
further distinction of kind within nursing knowledge. Sackett defines expertise as the ‘ability to use 
our clinical skills and past experience to rapidly identify each patient’s unique health state and 
diagnosis, their individual risks and benefits of potential interventions, and their personal values and 
expectations’ [Sackett et al 2000: 3]. 
This characterisation contains two elements already mentioned in the previous distinctions. Clinical 
expertise is directed towards individuals and their unique states and circumstances, picking up the 
understanding side of the first distinction (explanation versus understanding). It is also directed at 
their values and expectations, picking up the values side of the second distinction (knowledge of 
facts versus values). But it also suggests a practical recognitional skill is in play and that suggests a 
third, important, distinction: between explicit and tacit knowledge. 
The idea of tacit knowledge was first promoted by Michael Polanyi. In his book The Tacit Dimension 
he says: 
I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can know more than 
we can tell… Take an example. We know a person’s face, and can recognize it among a 
thousand, indeed among a million. Yet we usually cannot tell how we recognize a face we 
know. So most of this knowledge cannot be put into words. [Polanyi 1967: 4] 
Tacit knowledge is tacit because it is ‘more than we can tell’. We cannot tell how we know things 
that we know tacitly. But why not? Surely to be a form of knowledge, there must be something – 
some content – known? On the standard model of knowledge, this content is a belief (eg. that Terry 
is due for medication). But if so, why can this not be put into words?  
Reflection point: What kind of thing could be known but not be put into words? Do we use 
‘knowledge’ about anything other than knowing facts, knowing that something? 
Polanyi himself suggests a clue to this riddle: 
I may ride a bicycle and say nothing, or pick out my macintosh among twenty others and say 
nothing. Though I cannot say clearly how I ride a bicycle nor how I recognise my macintosh 
(for I don’t know it clearly), yet this will not prevent me from saying that I know how to ride 
a bicycle and how to recognise my macintosh. [Polanyi 1962: 88] 
Polanyi suggests that we call ‘tacit’ any knowledge of how to do something: practical knowledge. 
When one knows how to do something one knows something but typically one cannot put it fully 
into words. Nursing, being a practical discipline, contains much practical, tacit knowledge. This 
includes knowledge of how to do things: basic clinical skills but also the recognitional skills 
mentioned by Sackett et al.  
That recognitional skills are tacit is important to mental healthcare. For the last fifty years, both of 
the main diagnostic manuals for mental illness (the World Health Organisation’s International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD) and the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM)) have adopted an ‘operationalist’ approach. Syndromes are described by lists of 
observable or expressible symptoms. Presented with an individual, the diagnosis of a specific 
syndrome is justified because he or she has enough of the relevant symptoms which can be, as 
closely as possible, ‘read off’ from their presentation. Such an approach to diagnosis emphasises 
explicit knowledge. 
Nevertheless, there remains a key role for tacit knowledge because there is always a gap between 
even a very thorough description of a symptom and its expression by a particular patient or service 
user at a particular time [eg Sims 1988]. The skilled practioner learns to see that the words set out 
on the page apply to the lived experience before them. This skill is not itself a matter for explicit 
knowledge since sooner or later, whatever is written down in general terms has to be applied on the 
ward. It is a practical skill in recognition. 
We suggested in the first section that knowledge cannot rest merely on luck and still count as 
knowledge. Although Robin had a true belief that it was time for Terry’s medication, she did not 
know it.  
Reflection point: Does that restriction apply to tacit knowledge? Stop reading and think what might 
be the equivalent for practical or tacit knowledge of justification for explicit knowledge? How does 
practical or tacit knowledge avoid resting on mere luck? 
The clue is in the idea that tacit knowledge is a form of practical knowledge and practical knowledge 
is a skill. So the equivalent of justification for tacit knowledge is having developed a general ability 
through practice, repetition and criticism. This suggests the route to new practical or tacit 
knowledge for nurses: the arduous work of moving through the hierarchy connecting novice to 
expert practitioner [Benner 2004; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986]. 
Is there such a thing as nursing knowledge? 
In the previous three sections, we have examined three distinctions that apply to the knowledge 
that underpins nursing care. Knowledge can concern explanation (using laws of nature) or 
understanding (making sense though reasons); facts or values and be explicit or tacit. In each case, 
we have argued that nursing practice should be based on knowledge from both sides. This suggests 
that the way to learn and to generate new knowledge, both individually and as a discipline, varies. 
In this section we wish to raise a more provocative question: is there such a thing as ‘nursing 
knowledge’? This is not the same as asking whether nursing should be based on knowledge and 
whether nurses should keep up to date with new developments and findings. Of course it, and they, 
should. But is there a characteristic unified field of knowledge that could helpfully be called ‘nursing 
knowledge’ and can it help to define nursing itself? In an article called ‘Defining nursing knowledge’, 
Angela Hall says suggests that the answer to both is ‘yes’. She says ‘”What is nursing knowledge?” is 
a complex question, the answer to which helps define nurses as a profession’ [Hall 2005: 34]. We 
think that the answer to both questions is ‘no’ and that this places a particular burden or duty on 
nurses. 
We have argued that the knowledge nurses need to have lies on both sides of a range of significant 
distinctions: knowledge necessary for explanation but also for understanding; of facts but also 
values; and both explicit and tacit. This suggests that ‘nursing knowledge’ is not a simple unified kind 
at all but instead comprises different kinds or sorts all of which are necessary for the practice of 
nursing. 
To reject the idea that there is a unified underlying concept of ‘nursing knowledge’ is not to reject 
the idea that the different aspects highlighted in this chapter are all important and all are kinds of 
knowledge. They are but they are gathered together to underpin the nature and role of the 
profession of nursing: centrally what is needed for caring for patients and health service users. 
Nursing knowledge is whatever knowledge is needed properly to realise that aim or role. 
This places a heavy burden on nursing as a profession and individual nurses in maintaining their 
knowledge base. It is impossible to put limits in advance on the areas of human inquiry which might 
provide knowledge relevant for improving patient care. Even now, nursing education draws on the 
biological sciences and chemistry, psychology, communication, management science and moral 
philosophy. The duty for the future is to keep an open mind to developments from any other 
discipline that might have a bearing. 
Can nursing knowledge be co-produced? 
Much of the discussion of nursing knowledge focuses on the nurse as acquiring and having 
knowledge. But it is also important to consider the role of the patient or service user and in 
particular to consider their role as co-producer of knowledge.  
Historically, the role of the patient has been a passive one. The patient was thought of as the 
‘problem’ needing to be solved. That patients may themselves have knowledge has been regarded 
as a mixed blessing, with the role of nurse and clinical professionals being to extract the ‘wheat’ of 
knowledge from the ‘chaff’ of patients’ descriptions of their experience. This process was rendered 
more difficult in mental health nursing where there may be a concern that the patient lacks insight 
and whose testimony may therefore be unreliable. As well as making the generation of knowledge 
more difficult, this observer/object relationship can lead to therapeutic conflicts.  
Modern nursing has seen the development of service user /patient involvement, expert patients, 
self-management and peer support. These developments have changed the role of the patient from 
passive recipient of nursing to active player in a partnership. The term ‘co-production’ is applied to 
these and other partnerships. Co-production typically involves both professionals and service users 
(and often informal carers) bringing their skills and experience to a joint process that creates 
something new. This collaborative approach can be applied to the process of generating knowledge, 
both at the individual case level, and at a more widespread level in developing research and practice.  
Reflection point: consider the idea of nurses and patients co-producing knowledge. What are the 
challenges? What are the benefits? 
Some of the challenges will depend on the nature of knowledge. If, for example, we consider the 
definition ‘justified true belief’ then we need to consider whether both ‘justification’ and ‘truth’ can 
have common meaning to nurse and patient. Nurses are trained to assess information in a particular 
way; patients are not. Patients are living the condition, and living with the consequences of the 
condition; nurses are not. We also need to consider the power differences that exist as a result of 
the respective roles of nurse and patient including the legal powers that may affect the relationship. 
While these may be challenges, the differences in perspective, experience and even perception also 
offer potential benefits. This chapter has highlighted the diversity of forms of knowledge needed for 
nursing care. If we ensure that knowledge is co-produced, this broadens the experience and values 
that contribute to knowledge.  
Conclusion: the art of nursing 
We began this chapter by asking the very general question: Why should nurses aim to have 
knowledge of their subject? What is the value of knowledge? One way to address that is to consider 
the nature of knowledge itself. On a traditional view dating back to Plato, knowledge is a state that 
fuses belief, truth and justification. Even if a circular definition, this highlights the intimate 
connections between these concepts. Given this, nurses should aim at knowledge because, among 
other things, knowledge supports successful action and nursing is a practical discipline. 
Despite the general argument for the importance of knowledge for nursing, subsequent sections 
have highlighted the different kinds of knowledge that underpin nursing care, calling for quite 
different ways of acquiring new knowledge. And thus it seems that there is not a single unified field 
that nurses should aim to know. This suggests a central task for the nurses as experts in diverse 
forms of knowledge. In the presence of a particular individual, nurses have to select the knowledge 
appropriate to ‘each patient’s unique health state and diagnosis, their individual risks and benefits of 
potential interventions, and their personal values and expectations’ in Sackett’s phrase.  
This task fits a distinction between what the philosopher Immanuel Kant calls ‘determinate’ and 
‘reflective’ judgement in his Critique of Judgement [Kant 1987]. 
If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the 
particular under it, is determinate... But if only the particular is given and judgment has to 
find the universal for it, then this power is merely reflective. [Kant 1987: 18] 
In a determinate judgement, one already knows the general concept that is relevant to a particular 
instance, and deduces from it something that follows from that. For example, if one knows that Mrs 
Jones is suffering from mild depression and one knows that those who are mildly depressed are 
likely to respond well to CBT then one knows that Mrs Jones is likely to respond well to CBT.  
The case of a reflective judgement is different. It corresponds to the case of meeting a particular 
individual and seeking out the general concepts that fit him or her, for example, that he or she is 
suffering from depression. Kant argues that this is an essentially imaginative task involving a 
‘subjective harmony of the imagination with the understanding’. But he also thinks that this 
harmony is the source of pleasure in understanding art. 
Because nursing has to draw on an open ended list of other disciplines to match knowledge to the 
particular needs of individuals, it requires the exercise of what Kant calls reflective judgement. But 
further, if Kant is right then the knowledge at the heart of nursing, the knowledge to select the right 
subsidiary scientific and other knowledge called for by particular patients in particular situations, is 
an art. Thus nursing is an art as much as a science. 
Commentary by Jan Verhaegh, board member of European Network of (ex-)Users and Survivors of 
Psychiatry (ENUSP) and Autism Europe 
Health problems are always problems of the whole person. That means that they have a biological, 
psychological and social dimension. In the Netherlands we have physicians who treat mainly the 
physical dimension, psychotherapists who treat mainly the psychological dimensions and nurses 
who take care of both the physical and psychological dimensions. In some institutions nurses, who 
have the greatest contact with patients, are called ‘socio-therapists’ because of their focus on the 
social dimension. They need, practically, to be trained in such knowledge and skills for example to 
empower their patients. But they also need broader knowledge of their patients’ social worlds such 
as what it means to live in a patriarchal unequal world which can lead to violence, abuse, 
mistreatment and so on and thus in turn to mental and physical health problems.  
For example, recent research links the intelligence of people with Asperger’s syndrome to the 
experience social stress because of bullying, social conflicts and exclusion which can in turn lead to 
psychosis [Selten et al 2015]. The most intelligent young people suffering from Asperger’s are18 
times more likely to develop psychosis than a neurotypical child. To take care of such people, nurses 
need knowledge of the biological, psychological and social dimensions of health and illness. 
  
References 
Beauchamp, T.L. and Childress, J.F. (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics Oxford: Oxford University 
Press  
Benner, P. (2004) ‘Using the Dreyfus Model of Skill Acquisition to Describe and Interpret Skill 
Acquisition and Clinical Judgment in Nursing Practice and Education’ Bulletin of Science, Technology 
& Society 24: 188–19 
Dreyfus, H. and Dreyfus, S. (1986) Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise 
in the Era of the Computer, New York: The Free Press 
Fulford, K.W.M. (2004) ‘Ten Principles of Values-Based Medicine’ in Radden, J. (ed) The Philosophy of 
Psychiatry: A Companion New York: Oxford University Press, 205-34 
Gettier, E. (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis 23: 121-123 
Hall, A. (2005) ‘Defining nursing knowledge’ Nursing Times 101: 34–37 
Jaspers, K. ([1912] 1968) ‘The phenomenological approach in psychopathology’ British Journal of 
Psychiatry 114: 1313-1323 
Jaspers, K. ([1913] 1974) ‘Causal and “Meaningful” Connections between Life History and Psychosis’, 
trans. by J.Hoenig, in S.R.Hirsch and M.Shepherd. in Hirsch, S.R., and M. Shepherd, Themes and 
Variations in European Psychiatry, Bristol: Wright: 80-93 
Polanyi, M. (1962) Personal Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press  
Polanyi, M. (1967) The Tacit Dimension, Chicago: University of Chicago Press  
Sackett, D.L. Straus, S.E. Richardson, W.S. Rosenberg, W. and Haynes, R.B. (2000) Evidence-based 
Medicine: How to practice and teach EBM, Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone 
Selten, J.P., Lundberg, M., Rai, D. and Magnusson, C. (2015) ‘Risks for Nonaffective Psychotic 
Disorder and Bipolar Disorder in Young People With Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Population-Based 
Study’ JAMA Psychiatry doi: 10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2014.3059. [Epub ahead of print] 
Sims, A. (1988) Symptoms in the Mind: an introduction to descriptive psychopathology, London: 
Baillière Tindall  
Thornton, T. (2011) ‘Radical liberal values based practice’ Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 17: 
988-91 
Windelband, W. ([1894] 1998) ‘History and natural science’ Theory and Psychology, 8: 5-22 
Learning outcomes 
Readers will be able to: 
• List some fundamental distinctions between kinds of knowledge: understanding versus 
explanation, tacit versus explicit, facts versus values. 
• Articulate some of the key properties of knowledge in general 
• Differentiate between explanation and understanding. 
• Compare different views of the subjectivity or objectivity of value judgements. 
• List examples of tacit knowledge. 
• Outline the advantages of and challenges to the co-production of knowledge 
Further reading 
For an introduction to philosophical accounts of knowledge in general 
Pritchard, D. (2006) What is this thing called knowledge London: Routledge 
For a general book on philosophy for nursing 
Reed, J. and Ground, I. (1996) Philosophy for nursing, CRC Press 
For an account of nursing ethics 
Armstrong, A. (2010) Nursing ethics: a virtue-based approach, Palgrave 
For a wide ranging discussion of tacit knowledge knowledge 
Gascoigne, N and Thornton, T. (2013) Tacit Knowledge Durham: Acumen 
For a discussion of Dreyfus’ hierarchy of skills applied to nursing 
Benner, P. (2004) ‘Using the Dreyfus Model of Skill Acquisition to Describe and Interpret Skill 
Acquisition and Clinical Judgment in Nursing Practice and Education’ Bulletin of Science, Technology 
& Society 24: 188–19 
For discussion of the subjectivity or objectivity of values based practice 
Loughlin, M. (ed) Debates in Values-based Practice: arguments for and against, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Web resources 
Values based practice 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/med/study/research/vbp/ 
 
